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PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW-EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT-AN OWNER-EMPLOYEE CAN
QUALIFY AS A "PARTICIPANT" IN AN ERISA PENSION PLAN SPONSORED BY
HIS CORPORATION, AS LONG AS THE PLAN COVERS ONE OR MORE NON-
OWNER EMPLOYEES. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
When a participant in an employee benefit plan covered by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) files for Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, the first question asked is whether the interest in the plan can be
used to satisfy the claims of creditors and administrative expenses.' This
question has led to conflicts between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code since
their enactment in 1974 and 1979, respectively.2 This question was partially
solved, however, in 1992 when the United States Supreme Court decided
Patterson v. Shumate.3 In Patterson, the Court held that a participant's in-
terest in such a plan could not be used to satisfy the claims of creditors or
administrative costs because ERISA is applicable nonbankruptcy law that
protected plan benefits, thus making any restrictions on the transfer of inter-
ests in employee benefit plans covered under the act enforceable.4
Dr. Raymond B. Yates was a participant in a pension plan sponsored
by the corporation in which he was the sole owner.5 When his creditors filed
an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against him, the bankruptcy
trustee attempted to recover two preferential payments made by Dr. Yates to
the plan.6 The lower courts held that because Dr. Yates was the sole owner
of the sponsoring corporation, he could not be a participant in the plan, thus
removing his interest in the plan from the protection of ERISA.7 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals by holding that Dr. Yates could be a participant, so long as there
were other non-owner employees participating in the plan.8
This note first takes a look at the historical foundation for Yates and
how the lower courts disposed of the case. 9 It then explores the background
of the relationship between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, and how state
1. See Donna Litman Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code
Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used
To Pay Claims?, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219, 219 (1987).
2. See C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and State
Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 65 (2003).
3. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
4. Id. at 758.
5. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).
6. Id. at 8.
7. See id. at 9-11.
8. Id. at 6.
9. See infra Part II.
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law may also enter the equation.' 0 This note then shifts to the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in arriving at its decision to allow owner-
employees to participate in employee benefit plans." Finally, this note con-
cludes with an analysis of the significance of Yates and a brief look at what




Dr. Raymond B. Yates was the sole shareholder of Raymond B. Yates,
M.D., P.C., a professional corporation organized in Tennessee.13 Dr. Yates
was the administrator and trustee of his company's money purchase pension
plan and its profit sharing plan, the Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit
Sharing Plan ("Plan"). 14 The Plan always had at least one other employee
participating other than Dr. Yates and his wife. 15 As of June 30, 1996, the
time of the original action, there were four employees who had been desig-
nated as participants in the Plan, including Dr. Yates.' 6 As required by
ERISA, the Plan contained a spendthrift clause that stated "no benefits or
interest available hereunder will be subject to assignment or alienation, ei-
ther voluntarily or involuntarily."'
' 7
In December 1989 Dr. Yates borrowed $20,000 from the plan.18 A loan
agreement was set up in which Dr. Yates would repay the loan over five
years at a rate of eleven percent per annum. 19 Dr. Yates, however, failed to
make his scheduled payments under that agreement.20 In June 1992 the
money purchase pension plan merged into the profit sharing plan, at which
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. In re Yates, 287 F.3d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 2002).
14. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 8 (2004).
15. Id.
16. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 524.
17. Id. at 525.
18. Id. at 524.
19. Yates, 541 U.S. at 8.
20. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 524. There was some evidence that Dr. Yates made some of
his payments. See Joint Appendix at 21a, Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-458)
(recounting the deposition of Raymond B. Yates, M.D.). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
unfortunately, did not differentiate whether he made some payments but not all or whether he
never made any payments. See In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 521. It simply stated, "Dr. Yates
failed to make the monthly payments." Id. at 524. The Supreme Court, however, apparently
took this to mean that Dr. Yates never made any of the payments because it stated, "Yates
failed to make any monthly payment." Yates, 541 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
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time Dr. Yates renewed his loan for another five years, but again he failed
to make the monthly payments.21
In November 1996 Dr. Yates sold his house and used a portion of the
proceeds to repay the loan to the Plan.22 He repaid the balance due, along
with all accumulated interest, in two payments totaling $50,476.46.23 After
these payments, Dr. Yates's interest in the Plan amounted to approximately
$87 000.24
On December 2, 1996, approximately three weeks after Dr. Yates
made the repayments to the Plan, his creditors filed an involuntary petition
for bankruptcy against him.25 The petition was filed in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville 26 under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.27 Respondent, William T. Hendon, was
appointed the trustee of the bankruptcy estate.28
In August 1998 respondent Hendon filed a complaint against both the
29Plan and Dr. Yates as the Plan's trustee.  In the complaint, respondent
Hendon asked the court to make the following orders: (1) set aside Dr.
Yates's repayment to the Plan as preferential, and (2) order Dr. Yates as
trustee of the Plan to turn the $50,467.46 over to respondent for inclusion in
the bankruptcy estate.3°
A. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
at Knoxville
In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Ten-
nessee at Knoxville, both parties filed for summary judgment.3' In ruling for
the respondent Hendon, the court made two explicit holdings.32 First, the
court found that the two payments Dr. Yates made in repayment of his obli-
gation to the Plan were preferential under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code.33 Dr. Yates either failed to or chose not to challenge this finding on




25. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 524.
26. Id. at 521.
27. Id. at 524.
28. See Yates, 541 U.S. at 8.
29. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 524.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Yates, 541 U.S. at 9-10.
33. Id. at 9. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code essentially allows a bankruptcy
trustee to avoid a payment made to a creditor within ninety days prior to the filing of the
petition for bankruptcy, if such payment would result in the creditor getting more than he
would have through the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2004).
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appeal. 34 Second, the court held that the Plan's anti-alienation provision
could not be enforced to prevent respondent Hendon from avoiding the re-
payments to the Plan.35 The court reasoned that because Dr. Yates was the
self-employed owner of the company he did not qualify as a participant
under ERISA. 36 The anti-alienation clause therefore could not be enforced
via § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.37 The bankruptcy court's primary
authority for this holding was SEC v. Johnson38 and Fugarino v. Hartford
Life & Accident Insurance Co., 39 both of which were Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases.
40
B. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court .4 Although it admitted that
other circuits had held to the contrary, the court maintained that it was
bound by prior Sixth Circuit decisions such as Fugarino.42 In upholding the
bankruptcy court's holding that an owner of a company could not be a par-
ticipant in an ERISA plan, the district court held that because Dr. Yates had
never been a participant in an ERISA plan, none of the money he had ever
contributed to the Plan was protected by the anti-alienation clause.43 While
this meant that the bankruptcy trustee could void the $50,467.46 in loan
repayments to the Plan, it also seemed to indicate that the bankruptcy trustee
could have acquired Dr. Yates's entire interest in the Plan.44
34. Yates, 541 U.S. at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id. a 9-W.
37. See id. at 10.
38. 143 F.3d 260 (6th Cir. 1998). In Johnson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that ERISA did not apply to a corporate president's pension plan because the president was
both the employer and a plan beneficiary. Id. at 262. The plan's funds therefore were not
exempt from disgorgement in a securities fraud proceeding. Id.
39. 969 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992). In Fugarino, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an employer could not ordinarily be an employee or a participant in a benefit plan under
ERISA. Id. at 185-86. Consequently, a benefit plan whose sole beneficiaries are the com-
pany's owners cannot qualify as a plan under ERISA. Id. at 185.




44. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code states that all of a debtor's property interests
become part of the bankruptcy estate and that only those transfer restrictions enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law would be enforceable under § 541(c)(2). If the Plan's
transfer restriction is not enforceable under ERISA, then it is likely not enforceable at all,
making all of Dr. Yates's interest in the Plan subject to inclusion in the bankruptcy estate.
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C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard this case in order to decide
whether or not the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is able to void a
preferential loan repayment made by a debtor to his wholly-owned corpora-
tion's employee benefit plan barely three weeks before an involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition was filed by the debtor's creditors. 45 In affirming the deci-
sion of the district court, it held that neither ERISA nor Tennessee's state
law dealing with alienation of trusts was applicable nonbankruptcy law that
would be enforceable under § 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.46
1. The Applicability of ERISA to Yates and His Plan
The court first addressed the applicability of ERISA. It stated that
Sixth Circuit published case law clearly directed that, for the purposes of
ERISA, a sole shareholder of a business cannot be considered an employee,
but must only be considered an employer.47 Furthermore, as an employer,
the sole shareholder could not be a participant in an ERISA plan.4
The appellants (Yates and the Plan) brought three arguments asserting
that Fugarino was not valid.49 They argued that it (1) did not coincide with
a plain language reading of ERISA, (2) conflicted with Department of La-
bor advisory opinions, and (3) was contrary to similar decisions rendered by
eight other circuits.50 The court, however, maintained that it could not over-
rule Fugarino, and that for it to be overruled the arguments would have to
be brought in a rehearing en banc on Fugarino.
5 1
The appellants further argued that Fugarino was overruled by
HIPAA. 2 Specifically, they claimed that HIPAA provided that the term
"participant" in a group health plan also includes self-employed individu-
als.53 The court dismissed this argument, stating that not only was the Yates
plan not a group health plan, but also that there were other Sixth Circuit
decisions that were in accord with Fugarino that had been decided well
45. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 523.
46. Id. at 524.





51. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 525-26.
52. Id. "HIPAA" is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
53. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 526; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a) (2004).
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after HIPAA. 4 The court concluded that according to its case law, the
spendthrift clause in the Plan was not enforceable under ERISA.55
2. The Applicability of Tennessee Law to Yates and His Plan
The court next addressed the applicability of Tennessee law. The ap-
pellants argued that the Tennessee Personal Property Owner's Rights and
Garnishments Act of 1978 protected Yates' interest in the Plan.56 The Act
states, among other things, that interests in a retirement plan that is qualified
under certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code are exempt from the
claims of creditors of the participant or beneficiary of the plan, except those
claims brought by the State of Tennessee.57
The court stated that that this section of the Act applied only to exemp-
tions and that it does not make the use of a "transfer restriction" necessary,
apparently considering the term "transfer restriction" a term of art.58 Section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, only provides for the enforce-
ment of transfer restrictions applicable under nonbankruptcy law. 59 The
Tennessee statute therefore simply did not fall within the scope of §
541 (c)(2) because it only exempted interests in retirement plans and did not
literally provide for the enforcement of a "transfer restriction.
'" 60
The court of appeals concluded by stating that the exemption in the
Tennessee law was a right personal to the debtor and that Yates would have
to claim it on his own behalf, not as the trustee. 61 It also left open the ques-




Bankruptcy courts have often been the battleground for conflicts be-
tween the ERISA and the Federal Bankruptcy Code.63 The analysis of the
relationship between these bodies of law must begin with a question: "How
does ERISA work its way into the Bankruptcy Code in the first place?" The
answer to this question lies in understanding §541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy
54. In re Yates, 287 F.3d at 526.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) (2004).
58. In re Yates, 287 F.3dat 526.
59. See id. at 526-27.
60. Id. at 527.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Pryor, supra note 2, at 65.
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Code. 64 Next, a consideration of the landmark case addressing the relation-
ship between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, Patterson v. Shumate,65 will
give insight into exactly how the United States Supreme Court has resolved
the question of what law constitutes applicable non-bankruptcy law with
respect to pensions.66 At this point it becomes important to understand the
scope of ERISA, and exactly how ERISA defines employee, employer, em-
ployee benefit plan, and participant. 67 Finally, an overview of state law al-
ternatives to ERISA and Tennessee's law covering trusts will complete the
overall picture by shedding light on how the pension plan in Yates v. Hen-
don might have been handled if it were found to be outside the coverage of
ERISA.68
A. Applicable Non-bankruptcy Law and the Bankruptcy Code: Why
§541(c)(2) Exists and What It Was Meant To Accomplish
When a petition for Bankruptcy is filed, debtors and creditors begin the
process of determining what property goes into the bankruptcy estate. 69 The
Bankruptcy Code is nothing more than a system of laws that adjusts this
relationship between debtors and creditors. 70 A primary purpose for the en-
actment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was to make it easier for debtors to
make a "fresh start" by discharging their debts.71 When a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy case is filed, § 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a bank-
ruptcy estate is established that includes all of the debtor's legal and equita-
ble interests in property. 72 Section 541(b) lists a few types of property inter-
ests that are not to be included in the estate. 73 Furthermore, § 541(c)(1) pro-
vides, subject to subsection (c)(2), for the inclusion of property in the estate
despite such property being covered by any restrictions on transfer. 74 Sec-
tion 541(c)(2), however, states, "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
64. See infra Part III.A.
65. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
66. See infra Part III.B.
67. See infra Part III.C.
68. See infra Part III.D.
69. Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1068
(2002).
70. Id.
71. Pryor, supra note 2, at 66.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 54 1(a) (2004); see also Donna Litman, Bankruptcy Status of "ERISA
Qualified Pension Plans "-An Epilogue to Patterson v. Shumate, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 637, 638-39 (2001).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2004).
74. Id. § 541(cX1).
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ruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title. 75 It has been said that §
541(c)(2) simply preserves under federal law those spendthrift transfer re-
strictions that were previously enforceable under state law. 76 It is important
to note that ERISA in no way preempts the Bankruptcy Code because its
preemption rule does not apply to any federal law. 7
Because § 541(c)(2) does not define "applicabte nonbankruptcy taw"
or its use of the term "trust," the courts have taken this task upon them-
selves, but their decisions have been widely varied.78 Commentators have
also noted portions of the legislative history in attempting to interpret the
meaning of § 541(c)(2).79 One House Report was noted as stating that §
541(c)(2) "preserved" spendthrift restrictions enforceable under state law,
indicating that it may simply have been meant to preserve the previous state
law exclusions. In interpreting this report, some courts have held §
541(c)(2) to apply only to state law, while others have considered them to
be simply examples of interests that would be excluded, but consider all
types of interests and both federal and state laws in determining what §
541(c)(2) applies to.8'
As a result of these considerations of § 541(c)(2) and the sparse inter-
pretive notes, there are three possibilities for how the section applies to
ERISA plans: (1) ERISA plans are exempt because ERISA is applicable
nonbankruptcy as described in § 541(c)(2); (2) ERISA plans are exempt
because state law is applicable nonbankruptcy as described in § 541(c)(2);
or (3) ERISA plans are not exempt because the exclusion for trusts was not
meant to include ERISA plans.
82
75. Id. § 541(c)(2).
76. Jonathan T. Baer, ERISA Preemption of State Exemption Law: The Effects in Bank-
ruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 615, 616 (1990). In fact, several courts have held that the term
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" in § 541(c)(2) refers only to exemptions under state law.
See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor, 706 F.2d 574, 577 (5th Cir. 1983); see also McLean v. Central
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding
that allowing ERISA to be applicable nonbankruptcy law promoted the principal purpose of
ERISA). Contra Anderson v. Raine, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
77. Robert B. Chapman, A Matter of Trust, or Why "ERISA-Qualified" is "Nonsense
Upon Stilts": The Tax and Bankruptcy Treatment of Section 457 Deferred Compensation
Plans as Exemplar, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 81 (2004).
78. See Seiden, supra note 1, at 237-39.
79. Id. at 237.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 237-38. Compare Samore v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984), and
Nelson v. White, 47 Bankr. 410 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 195) (finding 1hal congress did not
intend "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include ERISA), with Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982), and Shults v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 32 Bankr. 767
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (both holding that ERISA qualified as "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" for § 541(c)(2)).
82. Seiden, supra note 1, at 238.
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B. Patterson v. Shumate: The Supreme Court Addresses What Non-
bankruptcy Law Is Applicable to Pensions for Purposes of § 541 (c)(2)
When the bankruptcy petition has been filed, the process of what is in-
cluded in the bankruptcy estate and what is excluded under § 541(c)(2) be-
gins.83 Cases addressing what qualifies as applicable nonbankruptcy law for
purposes of § 541(c)k2) have covered all points of the spectrum.84 Accord-
ing to one commentator, some of the reasons for this are "the complexity
and variety of the applicable laws and the applicable plan rights and inter-
ests and, in some cases, because of the judge's, attorney's or debtor's unfa-
miliarity with ERISA." 85 The landmark case Patterson v. Shumate86 finally
settled the issue.87
In Patterson, Joseph B. Shumate filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
which was later converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 88 Shumate had
worked for a furniture company for over thirty years and had always par-
ticipated in an ERISA pension plan with approximately 400 other employ-
ees. 89 The furniture company also went bankrupt, and the employee benefit
plan was terminated and liquidated.90 3ohn R. Patterson, as the trustee of
Shumate's bankruptcy estate, filed to have Shumate's interest in the plan
paid directly to him. 91 Patterson argued that the interest was excluded from
his bankruptcy estate, but the district court disagreed, holding that §
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code applied only to state law and not to fed-
eral regulations such as ERISA. 92 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that
ERISA was applicable nonbankruptcy law.93 The court of appeals also held
that ERISA plans included enforceable transfer restrictions by way of the
anti-alienation clause.94 Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned that
83. Plank, supra note 69, at 1068.
84. Seiden, supra note 1, at 229. It has been noted that the Supreme Court uses a "plain-
meaning" standard when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. Alan R. Lepene & Sean A.
Gordon, The Case for Derivative Standing in Chapter 11: "It's the Plain Meaning, Stupid,"
11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 313, 313 (2003).
85. Seiden, supra note 1, at 229.
86. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
87. Dorothy Sanders Wells, Exclusion of Retirement Plan Assets from a Debtor's Bank-
ruptcy Estate after Rhiel v. Adams: An Update on 6th Circuit Case Law, 40 TENN. B.J. 25,
25-26 (2004).
88. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 755.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 755-56.
92. Id. at756.
93. Id.
94. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 756. An anti-alienation clause in an employee benefit plan




Shumate's plan contained a restriction on transfer that was enforceable un-
der applicable nonbankruptcy law and thus should be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 95 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the question "whether an anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-
qualified pension plan constitutes a restriction on transfer enforceable under
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' for purposes of the § 541(c)(2) exclusion of
property from the debtor's bankruptcy estate." 96 In a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Blackmun, the court affirmed the decision of the Fourth
Circuit and held that it did.
9 7
The Court cited the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA
as its primary source of guidance.98 Because a simple reading of § 541(c)(2)
indicates that the debtor could enforce any transfer restriction enforceable
under any nonbankruptcy law, and because Congress had expressed no view
to the contrary, the transfer restriction in Shumate's plan was enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 99
Two questions remained after Patterson: (1) What exactly is an ERISA
plan, and (2) If a plan is not an ERISA plan, then what Bankruptcy provi-
sions might it be exempt under? 00
C. The Scope of ERISA
ERISA was enacted in 1974 and is one of the most complex and diffi-
cult federal regulations to interpret. 01 In order to better understand the
scope of ERISA, it is important to first understand why ERISA exists. 102
This section then explores the definitions of employee, employer, employee
benefit plan, and participant, and how those definitions affect the coverage
of ERISA.' 3 Finally, this section considers what it means for an employee
benefit plan to be an "ERISA plan."'
04
95. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 756-57.
96. Id. at 757.
97. Id. at 760. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which he stated that two tradi-
tions of statutory interpretation, the consistent usage of phrases within an act and close atten-
tion to the text and methodology of the act, were sufficient to support the court's finding. Id.
at 766-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 757.
99. Id. at 758.
100. Pryor, supra note 2, at 74.
101. Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's Agreement in Legal Theory
and in Modern Practice. United States, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 87, 105 (1998).
102. See infra Part III.C.1.
103. See infra Part 1II.C.2.
104. See infra Part III.C.3.
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1. What is ERISA, and Why Does It Exist?
Congress felt it important to protect the interests of employees partici-
pating in employer-sponsored benefit plans so it enacted ERISA in 1974.05
The act was codified in part under the Department of Labor statutes, with
the remainder in the Internal Revenue Code. 10 6 This was done in order to
provide for the enforcement of ERISA by the Department of Labor while at
the same time providing tax benefits to ERISA plans under the Internal
Revenue Code. 10 7 Another goal of Congress was to create an incentive that
would increase the use of pension plans. 10 8 A third goal was to provide a
single, uniform set of laws governing pension plans, 109 a goal recognized by
the Supreme Court in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.' 0 As one com-
mentator put it, "Without federal mandated uniformity, Congress feared that
employers would face state generated multiformity.""' It has been noted
that Congress realized the impact that employee benefit plans could have on
employment, industry, and commerce.1 2 ERISA has two features that are of
primary importance to the employees: the anti-alienation clause in § 206(d)
and the preemption clause in § 514(a)) 3
a. Transfer restriction under ERISA
ERISA contains two sections that detail restrictions on transfers of in-
terests in covered plans. 14 Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA states that "[e]ach
pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."'"15 This regulation has been found to apply to all
105. Pryor, supra note 2, at 65.
106. Seidex, supra note 1, at 225. The Department of Labor statutes are in Title 29 of the
U.S.C., while the Internal Revenue Code is in Title 26.
107. Litman, supra note 72, at 639.
108. Pryor, supra note 2, at 70.
109. Id.
110. 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). In Fort Halifax a packing plant claimed that ERISA pre-
empted a state law that would require it to provide a one-time severance payment to employ-
ees in the event the plant closed. Id. at 8. The United States Supreme Court held that one
time payments did not fall under the scope of ERISA because (1) ERISA applied to em-
ployee benefit plans, not simply employee benefits, (2) preemption of this particular statue
would not further the purpose of ERISA's preemption clause, (3) preemption of this particu-
lar statute would not further the overall goals of ERISA, and (4) failure to preempt this par-
ticular statute would not create a incentive for employers to circumvent ERISA. Id. at 11-17.
111. Id. at 70-71.
112. Litman, supra note 72, at 639.
113. Pryor, supra note 2, at 65-66. The anti-alienation clause is codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d) (2004); the preemption clause is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004).
114. Seiden, supra note 1, at 238.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2004).
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types of retirement benefit plans except individual retirement accounts and
Keogh plans in which only owners or partners of a business participate.
16
Section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code states that no trust shall qualify
under that section unless the plan including the trust also includes a provi-
sion that the benefits it provides may not be assigned or alienated." 7 The
Congressional notes on ERISA explain that these provisions were included
to ensure that employees would be able to protect their retirement benefits
so the benefits would actually be available when they retired." 
8
There are four exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions, the
first two of which are found in § 206(d)(2) of ERISA." 9 The first exception
is found in the initial sentence of § 206(d)(2) which reads "there shall not be
taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed
10 percent of any benefit payment,....,120 This sentence, simply put, deals
with the beneficiary's right to voluntarily assign up to ten percent of his or
her benefits. 121
The second exception is found in the last sentence of § 206(d)(2),
which reads "a loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not be treated
as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by the participant's
accrued nonforfeitable benefit ....,,122 This sentence appears to deal with a
beneficiary who wishes to use his or her interest in a benefit plan as collat-
eral against a loan from the plan.'
23
The third statutory exception was enacted to codify several judicial de-
cisions that held that spouses or children in community property states could
reach a beneficiary's retirement benefits to satisfy child support or alimony
obligations. 24 The exception appears in § 206(d)(3)(A) of ERISA, which
states that the anti-alienation provision shall not apply to an order of the
court "if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations or-
der."'125 A qualified domestic relations order has been generally described as
any judgment, decree, or order made pursuant to the domestic relations law
or community property law state.' 26 This would include any court approved
settlements requiring a participant's plan benefits to be paid to a spouse,
116. Litman, supra note 72, at 640.
117. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (2004).
118. Seiden, supra note 1, at 240.
119. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2004).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (2004).
121. Seiden, supra note 1, at 240.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(2) (2004).
123. Seiden, supra note 1, at 240.
124. Id.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (codified in 1984 as part of the Retirement Equity Act of
1984).
126. Seiden, supra note 1, at 254 n.102.
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former spouse, or child in the form of alimony payments, child support, or
marital property rights. 
127
The final exception lies in § 206(d)(4) of ERISA and was also enacted
to codify several judicial exceptions.128 The exception applies to offsets that
a beneficiary is ordered or required to pay out of his plan benefits as a result
of a conviction or civil judgment, court order, or order for spousal annuity
payments.2 9
ERISA contains two provisions that both require covered plans to con-
tain anti-alienation clauses that will be broadly applied. 130 Furthermore, its
exceptions to the anti-alienation requirement are very narrowly drawn.13' In
regard to § 206(d), Patterson ultimately held that ERISA is nonbankruptcy
law that requires the enforcement of an anti-alienation clause as against
participants and creditors alike.1
32
b. Preemption under ERISA
Section 1144(a) of ERISA states that, as they relate to any employee
benefit plan, the provisions of Title I and Title IV supersede all state
laws. 33 This seems to indicate that ERISA reserves the power to regulate
any plan that would fall under ERISA's definition of a covered plan in §
1003(a). 134 In fact, one of the representatives who sponsored the act claimed
that the crowning achievement of ERISA is "the reservation to Federal au-
thority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded par-




128. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(4) (2004). An example of the type of judicial exception codi-
fied can be found in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 583 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ala.
1984). In St. Paul, the defendant was convicted of embezzlement from a bank. Id. at 1222.
The district court held that the anti-alienation clause in defendant's pension plan did not
prevent garnishment of his interest in the plan to repay the money he had embezzled. Id. at
1229. Congress, the court reasoned, did not intend ERISA to protect criminals from their
victims. Id. at 1226.
129. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(4)(A)-(C) (2004).
130. Seiden, supra note 1, at 242.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004).
134. Baer, supra note 76, at 622. Section 1003(a) states that ERISA covers any em-
ployee benefit plan that is established or maintained by an employer or employee organi-
zation engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. §
1003(a) (2004).
135. Baer, supra note 76, at 621-22 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 29, 197 (1974)).
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2. The Definitions of Employee, Employer, Employee Benefit Plan,
and Participant
ERISA defines "employee" as "any individual employed by an em-
ployer." 136 The legislative notes indicate that while the term is meant to
include anyone covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the term also
covers those not associated with unions or covered by collective bargaining
agreements. A common question is whether or not this description of
"employee" is broad enough to include sole shareholders or owner-
employers, or whether the statute must include an express term that includes
them. 3s
ERISA defines an "employer" as "any person acting directly as an em-
ployer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an em-
ployee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting
for an employer in such capacity.' ' 139 Although this definition does not spe-
cifically mention sole proprietors, sole shareholders, partners, or owner-
employees, it would appear to be broad enough to include them.' 40 It is also
interesting to note that ERISA defines employer "in relation to an employee
benefit plan."' 41 Based on a literal reading of the definition of "employee
benefit plan," one could reason that employee benefit plans must cover
more than one employee and employers, for purposes of ERISA, are only
those that employ more than one employee. 142
ERISA defines "employee benefit plan" as an "employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2004).
137. Litman, supra note 72, at 660; see also S. REP. No. 93-127 (1974); H.R. REP. No.
93-533 (1974). The Department of Labor has developed its own definition of employee as
well; it reads, "the term 'employee benefit plan' shall not include any plan, fund or program,
... under which no employees are participants covered under the plan ..... 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-3(b) (2004). In reference to "employee," paragraph (c) states that "[a]n individual and
his or her spouse shall not be deemed to be employees with respect to a trade or business...
which is wholly owned by the individual or by the individual and his or her spouse." 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c) (2004).
138. See Litman, supra note 72, at 661. The Supreme Court initially faced the problem of
defining the term "employee" for ERISA purposes in Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Dar-
den, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). In Nationwide, the Court adopted a common-law test for determin-
ing who qualified as an employee. Id. at 323. Of paramount importance, the Court stated,
was "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is ac-
complished." Id. at 323-24 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989)).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2004).
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employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.
143
An "employee welfare benefit plan" is a benefit plan that provides for
medical services or insurance benefits. 144 ERISA defines "employee pen-
sion benefit plan" as a plan or program established or maintained by an em-
ployer that "(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
coveTed employment oT beyond.' 145 As already mentioned, a literal interpre-
tation of this definition could result in the exclusion of plans covering only
one employee. 146 Interpretations by the courts and the Department of Labor,
however, have employed a looser definition, finding that employee benefit
plans under ERISA may cover only one employee.
1 47
ERISA defines "participant" as "any employee or former employee of
an employer. . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any
type from an employee benefit plan ... or whose beneficiaries may be eli-
gible to receive any such benefit."'
148
3. Which Employee Pension Benefit Plans Are "ERISA Plans"?
One commentator has interpreted ERISA's definition of a pension plan
as "a plan established or maintained by an employer ... that provides re-
tirement income to employees or defers employees' income for a period of
time up to or after termination of employment."1 49 There are two broad
categories of pension plans covered by ERISA: defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans.150
A defined benefit plan is a program in which the employer agrees to
pay a certain benefit to its employees upon their retirement.'' The employer
makes payments into a general trust based upon estimates of what will be
needed to make the promised benefit payments in the future. 15 2 A defined
contribution plan is a program in which a portion 'of the empltyee's pay
each period is deposited into a trust account on his or her behalf. 3 The
funds are then managed as an investment, and the employee's retirement
benefits will be based upon the performance of that investment. 14 The dif-
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2004).
144. Id. § 1002(1).
145. Id. § 1002(2)(A).
146. See supra note 125.
147. Litman, supra note 72, at 661.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2004).
149. Litman, supra note 72, at 640; see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2004).
1.. Seiden, supra note 1, a. 221.
151. Baer, supra note 76, at 186.
152. Id. at 186-87.




ference between the two plans is that in a defined benefit plan, the employer
runs the risk that its general fund will not be large enough to cover the
promised benefit payments, but in a defined contribution plan the employee
assumes all the risk that the investment fund will not perform well. 55 Fur-
thermore, while the ERISA definition of employee benefit plan does not
expressly include those plans whose only participants are sole shareholders
or owner-employees, the legislative history of ERISA and its subsequent
amendments indicate a congressional intent that they should be included in
the definition. 156
Title I of ERISA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enact regulations
necessary to enforce Title I.15 7 Labor Regulation 2510.3-3 in particular
lends clarity to the meaning of "employment benefit plan" by stating that no
employee benefit plan shall "include any plan, fund or program, other than
an apprenticeship or other training program, under which no employees are
participants covered under the plan, as defined in paragraph (d) of this sec-
tion. Section (d) simply states that employees become participants when
they either make a contribution under a defined contribution plan, or com-
plete their first year of work and are entitled to benefits under a defined
benefit plan.' 59 Section (c) of the regulation, however, states that a business
owner and the business owner's spouse "shall not be deemed to be employ-
ees . . . and [a] partner in a partnership and his or her spouse shall not be
deemed to be employees with respect to the partnership."'' 60 This might
seem to indicate that to be a participant one must be employee and to be an
employee one must not be the owner of the business or a partner in a part-
nership. Because section (c) begins with the phrase "for purposes of this
section," however, this is the section applicable to the analysis of whether or
not a plan has employees. 61 In other words, a business owner and spouse
(or business partner) may not be considered when determining if the plan in
question covers employees. 162 The logical result of this is that as long as the
plan has non-owner or partner participants, a working owner or partner may
be an employee and participant as well. 
63
155. Id.
156. Litman, supra note 72, at 664-65.
157. Id. at 665.
158. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (2004).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(d)(1)ii) (2004).
160. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c) (2004).
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D. What if It's Not ERISA-Qualified?: The Law Affecting the Alienabil-
ity of Interests in Trusts in Tennessee
Simply because a plan is not covered by ERISA does not mean that it
does not contain an enforceable transfer restriction. 164 As an alternative to
ERISA, courts may consider state law to determine whether or not a plan is
covered by an enforceable transfer restriction. 65 This section first looks at
the basic situations in which courts may use state law. 166 This section then
takes a brief look at Tennessee's law of trusts.1
67
1. State Laws in Determining the Bankruptcy Estate
Historically, courts have been widely divided over how state law will
apply as an alternative to, or in lieu of, ERISA.' 68 Many of these courts have
held transfer restrictions enforceable if the applicable state law recognized
the enforceability of such clauses, or similar "spendthrift" clauses. 169 Some
courts, however, have limited the applicability of state law by either exclud-
ing plans in which the beneficiary exerts control over the trust or by simply
excluding plans covered by ERISA.17
0
Also, as an alternative to exclusion of a debtor's interest via a state en-
forceable transfer restriction, § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts
several types of property from the bankruptcy estate. 17 Subsection (b),
however, allows states the opportunity to opt-out of these standard exemp-
tions by stating that state law may choose not to recognize the exemptions
in subsection (d).172 Under subsection (b)(2), therefore, a state may enact its
own laws governing exemptions. 173 If it does so, however, the debtor is lim-
ited to those exemptions and may not claim any of the federal exemptions in
subsection (d). 174
164. Chapman, supra note 77, at 100.
165. Seiden, supra note 1, at 245.
166. See infra Part II1.D.1.
167. See infra Part III.D.2.
168. See Seiden, supra note 1, at 245-47.
169. Id. at 245; see, e.g, Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust, 750 F.2d 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1985). In
Lichstrahl, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the phrase "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" in § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code referred only to state trust law. Id. at
1490.
170. Seiden, supra note 1, at 246-47; see, e.g., In re Slezak, 63 B.R. 625 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985). In Slezak the bankruptcy court held that a person's interest in a pension plan is
part of the bankruptcy estate if that person has complete control over the plan, regardless of
whether the plan contains a restriction against alienation. Id. at 628.
171. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2004).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2004).
173. Id. § 522(b)(2).
174. John K. Easom, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of
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Thus, if ERISA does not apply, under state law a debtor may attempt
to protect a beneficial interest in a pension plan one of two ways. First, the
debtor can attempt to enforce a transfer restriction under the applicable state
law. Second, the debtor can attempt to exempt the beneficial interest from
the bankruptcy estate under a state's exemption laws.
2. Tennessee's Law Concerning Pensions
Tennessee's law regarding pensions states that "any interest of any par-
ticipant or beneficiary in a retirement plan which is qualified under ... the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, [is] exempt from any and all claims of
creditors of the participant or beneficiary, except the state of Tennessee."
'1 75
The only exception to this rule, other than that reserved for the State of Ten-
nessee, is for claims arising out of a qualified domestic relations order.
176
This would seem to indicate that while a transfer restriction would not nec-
essarily be enforceable under state law, a debtor could simply exempt an
interest in a pension from the bankruptcy estate under state law.'
77
IV. REASONING
In Yates v. Hendon,178 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals's holding that a working owner of a com-
pany could not qualify as a participant in a plan covered by ERISA. 179 The
Supreme Court held that so long as there is at least one other non-owner
employee participating in the plan, the working owner can participate on
equal terms with the non-owner employee. 80
In support of its holding, the Court began by considering how ERISA
related to the Internal Revenue Code.' 81 It also considered the significance
of several exemptions found in ERISA and the plain meaning of the text in
various provisions. 8a The Court followed this by briefly pointing out how
its reading of ERISA advanced Congress's intended purpose of the act.1
83
Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 209 (2004).
175. TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105(b) (2004). Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-36-111 and 26-2-
104 also deal with the exemption of pension benefits, but they are both applicable only to
government sponsored plans. See Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 89-44 (1989).
176. TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105(c) (2004).
177. See generally id. § 26-2-105.
178. 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
179. Id. at 23.
180. ld. at 6.
181. Id. at 12. The Supreme Court prefaced its analysis by giving a brief description of
ERISA and its four titles. Id. at 6-7.
182. 1d. at 13.
183. Yates, 541 U.S. at 17.
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The Court then analyzed a 1999 Department of Labor opinion and how it
coincided with the Court's interpretation of ERISA. 184 The Court's next
point of analysis was how the Sixth Circuit misunderstood a key Depart-
ment of Labor regulation in Fugarino v. Hartford Life and Accident Insur-
ance Co. ' 85 The Supreme Court concluded its analysis by pointing out how
the Sixth Circuit had misinterpreted ERISA's anti-inurement provision.1
86
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that the
Court should give due respect to implementing agencies whenever they
issue authoritative interpretations of law. 187 Justice Thomas also concurred,
expressing his reluctance to rely on the implications of the text and exemp-
tions in ERISA relied upon by the Court.
188
A. The Majority Opinion
In the opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held
that working owners may participate in employee benefit plans as long as
there is at least one other non-owner employee participating at all times.
89
In reaching this decision, the Court looked at the text of ERISA and its rela-
tion to the Internal Revenue Code, 190 certain exemptions in ERISA, 91 the
Department of Labor's published opinion on the topic, 192 and how the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals had misinterpreted some of these.' 93 Ultimately the
court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit. 1
94
1. The Text of ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, and ERISA 's Ex-
emptions
The Court began its analysis by examining the text of ERISA. 95 It de-
termined that it would have to look to other provisions of ERISA because
the Act's definitions of employee and participant are uninformative.' 96 It
went on to assert, however, that because the text of ERISA contained ample
184. Id.
185. 969 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992).
186. Yates, 541 U.S. at 22.
187. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 12.
191. Id. at 12-13.
192. Yates, 541 U.S. at 17-18.
193. Id. at 22-23.
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 12.
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evidence of Congress's intent to include-working owners, it did not need to
resort to common law. 1
97
Because ERISA was enacted with consideration of the existing Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), it would have been contradictory for ERISA to estab-
lish a system in conflict with the IRC.198 Under the IRC, owners, partners,
and shareholders have been allowed to participate in tax qualified pension
plans since 1962.199 ERISA did not change this because Congress intended
ERISA to work alongside the IRC rather than against it.200 In support of this
finding, the Court noted provisions in Title I that exempt some ERISA plans
with working owners from certain requirements of ERISA that apply to
plans without working owners.20' If working owners were not originally
intended to be included in plans covered by ERISA, these exemptions
would have been unnecessary. 0 2
The.Court also reasoned that Title IV of ERISA and the IRC clarify
that an owner may have "dual status" according to their definitions.20 3 The
owner may simultaneously be an employer administering the plan and an
employee participating in the plan.204 The Court concluded by stating that
because the text of ERISA contained ample evidence of its scope and cov-
erage, it was confident that its holding was in line with Congressional intent
to include working owners as participants in plans covered by ERISA.2 °5
2. Congress 's Intended Purpose of ERISA
The Court maintained that its interpretation of ERISA furthered the
purposes intended by Congress.20 6 Because one of Congress's goals was to
encourage the creation of plans,20 7 the Court noted that allowing participa-
tion by working owners would increase plan creation and participation.2 8
Another Congressional goal was to create one uniform governing body of
law for pension and benefit plans. 209 Allowing the working owner to par-
ticipate in ERISA plans eliminated the need for maintaining federal law for
non-owner participant plans, and state law for working owner participant
197. Id.
198. See Yates, 541 U.S. at 12-13.




203. Id. at 16.
204. Yates, 541 U.S. at 16.
205. ld. at 16-17.
206. Id. at 17.
207. Id.; see supra Part III.C.1, note 44.
208. Yates, 541 U.S. at 17.
209. See supra Part III.C.1, note 46.
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plans. 210 Excluding working owners, however, from ERISA plans would
create administrative difficulties and would not be consistent with the goal
of uniform treatment of pension and benefit plans.21'
3. United States Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion 99-04A
The Supreme Court next shifted its analysis to a 1999 Department of
Labor Advisory Opinion.212 The Pension and Welfare Benefits Administra-
tion of the Department of Labor confirmed in advisory opinion 99-04A that
working owners could be participants in an ERISA plan.213 According to the
Administration, the text of ERISA taken in its entirety clearly shows Con-
gress's intent that working owners be included as participants under Title I
of ERISA.214 The report goes on to state that Congress could not have in-
tended for working owner-employees to be excluded under Title I and in-
cluded for tax purposes under Titles II and IV. 215 This would create un-
wanted tension between the titles.216
4. The Sixth Circuit's Misinterpretation of29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3
The Court next focused on how the Sixth Circuit's primary authority,
Fugarino v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co.,217 had misinter-
preted a key Department of Labor regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3.218 The
court in Fugarino interpreted the regulation as excluding owners from being
participants in any situation.2'9 The Court pointed out that the correct inter-
pretation is that owners may not be considered participants for purposes of
determining whether or not ERISA covers the plan.220 According to the
regulation, therefore, as long as ERISA has been determined to cover the
plan, the owner may be a participant alongside the non-owner employees. 2
210. Yates, 541 U.S. at 17.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see also Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin., United States Dept. of Labor,
Advisory Opinion 99-04A, 26 BNA Pension and Benefits Rptr. 559 (1999).
214. Yates, 541 U.S. at 17.
215. Id.
216. Id.
2M7. 969 F.2d t78 (6th Cit. 1992).
218. Yates, 541 U.S. at 18. For a brief description of the definition of "employee" in 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-3, see supra note 138.
219. Yates, 541 U.S. at 19.




5. The Sixth Circuit's Misinterpretation of ERISA's Anti-inurement
Provision
The Supreme Court's final point of analysis addressed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's treatment in Fugarino of ERISA's anti-inurement provision.222 The
court in Fugarino relied on this provision to declare that when someone
falls within the definition of employer, they may never be entitled to any
benefits from the plan.22 3 The correct reading of the provision, according to
the Supreme Court, is that the benefits must be reserved for distribution
only to plan participants.224 The provision does not apply in any way to
whether a working owner-employee may be a plan participant.2 25 The pur-
pose of the anti-inurement provision is to limit fiduciary abuse by employ-
ers, a purpose that would not be furthered by excluding working owner-
employees from receiving plan benefits under an ERISA plan.226 The anti-
inurement provision, therefore, does not act as a barrier to working owner-
employees being participants in an ERISA plan.227
6. The Remand
The Court remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with its decision.228 In light of Yates' questionable
conduct with respect to the loan, the Supreme Court authorized the court of
appeals to consider: (1) whether or not Yates' repayments to the Plan be-
came part of his interest in the plan that was excluded from the bankruptcy
estate, and (2) even if they were, could the bankruptcy trustee still exercise
his power to avoid the preferential transfers?
229
B. The Concurrences
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he declared that
"[t]he Court uses a sledgehammer to kill a gnat., 230 In his view, when an
administering agency, such as the Department of Labor issues an authorita-
tive opinion, that opinion should be afforded due respect.23' Because the
222. Id. The anti-inurement provision basically states that a plan's assets may not inure
to, or be used for, the benefit of the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2004).
223. Yates, 541 U.S. at 22.
224. Id.




229. Yates, 541 U.S. at 24.
230. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Solicitor General issued Opinion 99-04A to specifically address the issue in
this case, Justice Scalia felt that the Court should not have bothered with its
lengthy analysis of ERISA's text.232 He stated that because the Court did
embark on its crusade of statutory construction, much of the authority of
agency interpretations would be lost.233 In his view, this result will invite
lengthy litigation of issues that could have been easily resolved through the
234use of an authoritative agency decision.
Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he criticized
the Court's use of the text of ERISA as dispositive of ERISA's scope. 2 35 He
took the position that many of the exemptions that the majority relied upon
in its opinion could just as easily have been used to support the view that
working owners could not be participants in plans covered by ERISA.236
Because the text of ERISA was ambiguous, Justice Thomas would have
remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit with an instruction to use the
common law definition of employee to determine if Yates also qualified as
a participant. 37
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of Yates v. Hendon is twofold. First, the decision is of
utmost importance to the working small business owner who is trying to
structure an employee benefit plan.238 Second, the decision is important to
the federal circuit courts because it finally resolves the ongoing conflict
between them as to whether a working owner may participate in an em-
ployee benefit plan covered by ERISA.239
This section first examines the impact the Yates decision might have
on the small business owner. 240 It then considers the different approaches
taken by the federal circuit courts in addressing the issue of working owner
participation in employee benefit plans.24'
232. Id. at 24-25.
233. Id. at 25.
234. Id.
235. Yates, 541 U.S. at 25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 25-26.
237. Id. at 26.
238. See Retirement Capital Group Comments on Yates v. Hendon, MARKET WIRE (San
Diego), Mar. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 63920914.
239. See generally Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
240. See infra Part V.A.
241. See infra Part V.B.
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A. The Significance of Yates v. Hendon to the Working Small Business
Owner
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Yates v. Hendon is im-
portant to working small business owners because it allows them to set up
employee benefit plans in which they may participate on equal terms with
the non-owner participants. 242 Also, allowing working owners the protec-
tions afforded by ERISA will encourage them to establish and maintain
employee benefits plans,243 which is one of Congress's intended goals for
ERISA. 24
There are over ten million people in the United States who are self-
employed.245 Several hundred thousand of these people participate in em-
ployee benefit plans sponsored by their businesses.246 One of Congress's
stated goals of ERISA was to create one single authoritative body of law
governing pension and benefit plans.2 47 It is clear that under Patterson v.
Shumate,248 non-owner employees can exclude their entire interest in em-
ployee benefit plans covered by ERISA by invoking ERISA's anti-
alienation provisions.249 If the Supreme Court's holding in Yates had been to
affirm the Sixth Circuit's holding, however, working owner participants
would have been unable to invoke ERISA's anti-alienation provisions. In-
stead they would have had to rely on state exemption statutes to protect
them and then only to the extent allowed by such statutes and not preempted
by ERISA. 250 By rejecting the holding of the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme
Court avoided establishing a two-tier system governing pension and benefit
plans: one of state law governing working owners and one of federal law
governing non-owner employees.25' Because of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Yates, working small business owners now have an extra incentive to
establish and maintain benefit plans for their employees and themselves.
252
242. See Marianne B. Culhane & Robert M. Zinman, Bankruptcy Cases on the Supreme
Court's October Term: Part 11, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 60 (2003).
243. Id.
244. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
245. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Yates v.
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-458).
246. Id.
247. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
248. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
249. See id.
250. Culhane, supra note 245, at 60.
251. See Yates, 541 U.S. at 17.
252. ERISA Shields Doctor's Pension, 14 No. 8 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004,
at 1.
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B. The Resolution of Conflict Between the Circuits
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Yates is also significant
because it resolves a long-standing split between the federal circuits as to
whether a working owner may participate in his own company's employee
benefit plan.253 Before Yates, the circuits who had addressed this issue were
split four to three in favor of not allowing working owner participation. 54
Those circuits not allowing working owners to participate were the
First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. The First Circuit held in Kwatcher
v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund255 that ERISA specifi-
cally had separate definitions for employee and employer; therefore, the
sole owner of a business could not be an employee for purposes of
ERISA.2 56 The Sixth Circuit held similarly, in Fugarino v. Hartford Life
and Accident Insurance Co., that the sole owner of a business could not be a
participant in a benefit plan under ERISA.257 The Seventh Circuit, in Giar-
dono v. Jones,258 held that an employer could not be a participant in an
ERISA plan because plan benefits must never inure to the benefit of the
employer 9 Finally, the Tenth Circuit held in Peckham v. Board of Trus-
tees of International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Union
260
that contractors who served in a dual role as employer and employee were
not to be considered employees for purposes of participation in employee
benefits plans covered by ERISA.261
For the other side of the argument, the Fifth Circuit held in Vega v. Na-
tional Life Insurance Services, Inc.262 that a husband and wife who were co-
owners of the business could be considered employees for purposes of par-
253. See Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Split, 14 No. 8 CONSUMER BANKR. NEwS, Apr.
1, 2004, at 4.
254. See generally Yates, 541 U.S. at 11.
255. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989). In Kwatcher, a business owner who had made pay-
ments to a union pension plan was deemed not eligible to receive the benefits because he was
an employer and not an employee. See id. at 963.
256. Id. at 960.
257. 969 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
258. 867 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1989). Giardono was also a case involving union benefits. Id.
In that case the employer was held not to have status to bring an ERISA claim because he
could not qualify to be a participant in the plan in question. Id. at 413.
259. Id. at 411-12.
260. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981). In a case in which the facts were nearly identical to
those of Kwatcher, the Tenth Circuit held in Peckham that the petitioners were not eligible
for union benefits because ERISA precluded employers from participation in employee
pension benefit plans. Id. at 426-27.
261. Id.at427.
262. 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999).
20051
UALR LAW REVIEW
ticipating in the company's employee benefit plan covered by ERISA.2 63
The Fourth Circuit, in Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia,
264
held that a sole shareholder was eligible to participate in an employee bene-
fit plan under ERISA.
65 Finally, the Seventh Circuit held in In re Baker
266
that although the debtor was the majority share-holder of the corporation, he
26
was considered an employee. 267 Therefore, under ERISA his interest in the
company's employee benefit plan was excluded from the bankruptcy es-
tate.
268
As previously stated, one of Congress's goals for ERISA was to pro-
vide a single uniform body of law governing pension and benefit plans.2 69 It
seems that part of this should also be uniform interpretation and enforce-
ment. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Yates v. Hendon ad-
vances this goal by ensuring that all federal courts interpret alike the provi-
sions governing "employer," "employee," and "participant."
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Yates v. Hendon moves
two sometimes disparate bodies of law, ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code,
one step closer together. In holding that working owners who are considered
"employees" can participate in employee benefit plans sponsored by their
companies, the Supreme Court has provided a real benefit that will be most
easily recognized by small business owners, in that they will have the incen-
tive to provide employee benefit plans. 270 The benefits of these plans will
not rest solely on a working owner, though, as many non-working owners
will now have access to employee benefit plans that they normally would
not. While the Supreme Court's decision in Yates is one step towards recon-
ciliation between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, its remand to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals appears to set the stage for the next step towards
that end. The Supreme Court specifically instructed the Sixth Circuit to de-
termine whether the bankruptcy trustee can avoid the preferential payments
Dr. Yates made to the Profit Sharing Plan, and whether those payments in
fact became part of Dr. Yates's interest in the Profit Sharing Plan.27 1 The
resolution of that issue will help to further clarify the area. Dr. Yates chose
to pay one creditor at the expense of other creditors. Whether employee
263. Id. at 291-92.
264. 11 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 1993).
265. Id. at 450. In Madonia, the Fifth Circuit held that the sole shareholder was also an
employee because the sole shareholder drew a paycheck from the corporation, was listed on
the corporate tax forms as an employee, and actually listed the corporation as his employer
on the plan application. Id. at 449.
266. 114 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 1997).
267. ld. at 639.
268. Id. at 639-40.
269. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 232.
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benefit plans have senior status among creditors has not been definitively
resolved.
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